Obligasi PERUSAHAAN diincar, RDPT ?? ... 280112

STRATEGI INVESTASI: Lembaga investor pilih obligasi korporasi Oleh M. Tahir Saleh Jum'at, 27 Januari 2012 | 19:47 WIB ... investasi surat utang/obligasi itu terkait dengan investasi reksa dana pendapatan tetap ... JAKARTA: Investor institusional akan cenderung memilih obligasi korporasi dan saham dengan mengincar imbal hasil tinggi guna menyelaraskan investasi jangka panjang sesuai dengan kebutuhan perusahaan. Direktur Investasi PT Taspen (Persero) Taufik Hidayat mengatakan sebagai perusahaan yang mengelola asuransi, jaminan hari tua, dan dana pensiun tentu horizon investasi dalam jangka panjang. Oleh karena itu, strategi investasi yang dipilih menyesuaikan dengan kebutuhan jangka panjang. Dia mengatakan meskipun tingkat bunga turun drastis, akan tetapi investor institusional seperti Taspen tidak bisa menghindari kebutuhan atas pembelian obligasi. “Investor institusional prefer ke bond korporasi dengan return yang besar. Bagaimana dengan saham? Meskipun semester pertama dan kedua up and down, namun kami masih bisa untung. Selama tahun lalu performa luar biasa meski naik 3,2%, tapi termasuk 3 negara dengan indeks positif,” katanya dalam acara “Investasi dan Portofolio 2012” di Jakarta, hari ini, Jumat, 27 Januari 2012. Dia mengatakan faktor pendorong laju imbal hasil (yield) obigasi korporasi turun di antaranya fundamental ekonomi dalam negeri yang baik sehingga bisa menurunkan yield obligasi karena risiko rendah. Selain fundamental, rendahnya suku bunga global dan domestik juga menyokong penurunan yield. Hal itu, katanya, terefleksikan dengan likuiditas pasar yang tinggi ketika pemerintah menjual SUN dan kelebihan permintaan hingga Rp50 triliun padahal target indikatif Rp7 triliun. Adapun faktor penghambat turunnya yield obligasi korporasi di antaranya krisis global yang belum selesai, besarnya pasokan obligasi korporasi di mana jumlahnya mencapai Rp134,6 triliun dengan jumlah tahun ini diperkirakan emisi baru Rp40 triliun. Dengan kondisi tersebut, kata Taufik, investor institusional seperti dana pensiun lebih memilih obligasi dengan return tinggi. Strateginya, katanya, perseroan membeli obligasi pada awal tahun dan meningkatkan frekuensi trading obligasi. Terkait dengan saham, dengan proyeksi indeks harga saham gabungan (IHSG) antara 4.500 dab 5.500 akan mendorong perseroan memperbesar saham dan mengerucutkan porsi deposito. “Kami juga tingkatkan trading di tengah fluktuasi saham. Ada satu lagi, yakni reksa dana. Kami akan diversifikasi, bisa kami jadikan benchmark,” katanya. (LN)

rdPU @cimb + principal ... 240112

JAKARTA: PT CIMB-Principal Asset Management menggandeng PT Bank CIMB Niaga Tbk sebagai agen pemasaran produk reksa dana pasar uang CIMB Principal Cash Fund. CIMB Principal dan CIMB Niaga, yang sama-sama anggota Grup CIMB, menandatangani kontrak kerja sama pada akhir pekan lalu. ”Pembentukan Reksa Dana CIMB-Principal Cash Fund sebagai alternatif investasi jangka pendek di pasar uang dengan tingkat pengembalian yang lebih menarik dibandingkan dengan deposito,” ujar Direktur CIMB Principal Reita Farianti dalam siaran persnya hari ini, 24 Januari 2012. Budiman Tanjung, Head of Prefered Private Wealth Management CIMB Niaga, menilai produk bernama CIMB-Principal Cash Fund itu dapat menjadi solusi bagi nasabah yang membutuhkan investasi jangka pendek dengan tingkat pengembalian yang maksimal. Hingga akhir tahun lalu, CIMB Principal mengelola reksa dana senilai Rp1,43 triliun, menurun dari posisi Desember 2010 sebesar Rp1,7 triliun. http://www.bisnis.com/articles/pemasaran-reksa-dana-cimb-niaga-gaet-principal-cash-fund Sumber : BISNIS.COM

tren RD pt, s, c, dan IHSG 2011 ... 210112

reksa dana TOP DUNIA ditinggalkan ... 200112

Investors exit big-name funds as stars fail to shine ReutersReuters – 38 minutes ago By Sinead Cruise and Tommy Wilkes LONDON (Reuters) - Investors rattled by unpredictable global markets are losing faith in star managers to shield them from painful losses, with some of the industry's best known names topping a list of funds which hemorrhaged cash in 2011, Lipper data shows. Edouard Carmignac, the investment veteran who founded funds firm Carmignac Gestion, and Sanjeev Shah, the Fidelity Worldwide Investments trailblazer, are among those who struggled to maintain cult followings, after a flight to safety tempted fans to switch into cash and other passive products. Carmignac's 5.7-billion-pound Investissement A Fund suffered the equivalent of 919.3 million pounds of net outflows in the year to December 31, the second-largest spate of annual redemptions recorded by all mutual funds available for sale in the UK, the data from Lipper shows. Investors pulled 491 million pounds from Shah's 2.2-billion-pound Special Situations Acc Fund over 2011, the 17th largest loss in absolute terms of all the 6,400-plus funds tracked by the data. Andrew Whiteley, director at financial advisor Provisio, said managers' failure to navigate volatile markets last year, as well as growing investor awareness about cheaper products, was combining to hit demand for these long-celebrated names. "Many 'star' managers were caught without shorts when the tide went out (in 2011) and I think that investors have started to look at cost as a filter for fund selection ahead of performance," he said. Failing to beat even benchmarks last year is hurting reputations, especially at a time when more and more investors are turning to exchange traded funds (ETFs), which trade like stocks and offer less-costly index exposure. Carmignac's fund dropped 12.87 percent last year, underperforming the MSCI AC World CR USD index, while Shah's fund slumped 14.61 percent versus a 4.17 percent fall in the FTSE All-Share TR index, Lipper data shows. "As an equity fund, Carmignac Investissement A was naturally affected in 2011 by the general rise in risk aversion among European investors. Consequently, the Fund suffered some outflows," Investment Committee Member Didier St Georges said. Shah, who stepped into Anthony Bolton's shoes to run the UK portion of the Special Situations fund, said strong momentum bias in markets had hurt his investment style. The fund saw some larger, institutional investors shift money out of the fund as a result of asset allocation, a Fidelity spokesperson added. PULLING POWER Other star managers to lose pulling power last year included Will Landers, the BlackRock manager whose BGF Latin American Fund A2 USD suffered the biggest investor exodus in absolute terms in 2011. The fund lost the equivalent of 938 million pounds and now runs 2.97 billion pounds, the Lipper data showed. BlackRock blamed the outflows on European volatility but said they expected Latin America to outperform relative to global equity markets when markets stabilized, as was the case during the turmoil of 2008 and 2009. Aled Smith, manager of M&G's 1.23-billion-pound American A Inc fund, lost the equivalent of 781 million pounds, ranking it in seventh spot, according to the Lipper data. M&G said Smith's 3-5 year investment approach faced performance headwinds in 2011 as the market chased perceived safety and immediate cash returns at the expense of the long term picture of individual companies, no matter how sound. JP Morgan Asset Management provided its own numbers for Austin Forey's $6.32-billion Emerging Markets Equity Fund, which saw $1.48 billion leave, a larger outflow in absolute terms than that posted by BlackRock's Will Landers. "We did see some European institutional investors completely reduce their emerging markets (EM) exposure in an indiscriminate manner across all funds, not just this particular fund. In many cases they sold out of all their EM holdings," Emily Whiting, client portfolio manager at JP Morgan, said. Much of the money flowed into bond and liquidity funds, though some has started to trickle back this year, she added. BRAND APPEAL It wasn't just individual names who suffered hefty outflows. Some fund firms had several products in the top 50, indicating a fall in the pulling power of a brand as well as a star manager. The asset management arm of UBS, the Swiss bank shaken by a rogue trader scandal, suffered extensive outflows in several funds, including money market funds. The firm's 3.09-billion-pound UBS (Lux) Money Market Fund - USD P-acc lost the equivalent of 897 million pounds, the third largest outflow of any fund, according to Lipper data. The UBS (Lux) Money Market Fund CHF P-acc shed the equivalent of 357 million pounds, leaving it with just 877 million in December. The Euro version lost 480 million, to end the year managing 1.69 billion pounds, the data shows. Meanwhile, UBS watched 288 million pounds leave its 316 million pounds (Lux) Eq Fd - Emerging Markets (USD) P-acc fund, and 225 million pounds leave its (Lux) Eq Fd - Euro Co Multi Strategy fund, which now manages the equivalent of 642 million pounds. UBS confirmed the numbers but declined to comment further. (Editing by Mark Potter)

danareksa YAKIN terproteksi dan pendapatan tetap

Danareksa Telurkan 6 Produk Reksa Dana Baru \ Oleh: Agustina Melani Ekonomi - Kamis, 19 Januari 2012 | 17:48 WIB INILAH.COM, Jakarta - PT Danareksa Investment Management (DIM) meluncurkan 6 produk reksa dana terbaru awal tahun ini. Reksa dana tersebut terdiri dari tiga reksa dana terproteksi dan tiga reksa dana pendapatan tetap. "Dengan optimisme tinggi, kami memulai tahun 2012 dengan meluncurkan produk-produk tersebut, meski kondisi pasar masih dipengaruhi krisis Eropa," tutur Direktur Danareksa Investment Management Zulfa Hendri dalam siaran persnya di Jakarta, Kamis (19/1). Salah satu reksa dana terproteksi yang diluncurkan yakni Danareksa Proteksi Pendapatan Dinamis I. Produk ini dapat memberikan proteksi 100% terhadap pokok investasi, disertai dengan tingkat pengembalian hasil stabil dan terukur sehingga investor bisa memperoleh hasil bersih (nett) sampai dengan 6,5% per tahun. "Selain itu investor juga mendapatkan pembagian dividen produk ini dalam waktu periodik per tiga bulan," ujar Zulfa. Lebih lanjut ia mengatakan, produk ini memiliki komposisi instrumen minimal 80% dalam obligasi korporasi yang memperoleh peringkat idAA+ dari Pefindo, dan minimal 20% pada pasar uang. Untuk dua reksa dana terproteksi lainnya yaitu Danareksa Proteksi Pendapatan Maxima II dan III yakni produk reksa dana terproteksi yang fokus berinvestasi pada surat utang negara (SUN). "Saat ini penjualan seluruh reksa dana terproteksi tersebut dilakukan bank nasional. Dengan waktu singkat penjualan telah mencapai 100% dari yang ditetapkan," tutur Zulfa. Sementara untuk tiga reksa dana pendapatan tetap, yaitu Danareksa Melati Pendapatan Tetap IV dan V dengan total komitmen Rp200 miliar. Danareksa Melati Platinum Rupiah II dengan indikasi imbal hasil bersih minimal 6% per tahun. Produk ini memiliki komposisi 80% SUN dan durasi terkonsentrasi pada jangka pendek dan menengah. Selain itu, maksimum 20% dananya dapat ditempatkan pada posisi saham agar para investor berpeluang memperoleh tambahan pengembalian dana (return) dari pasar saham dengan resiko rendah. [mre]

reksa dana saham JANUARY EFFECT 2012

January Effect Bertaji Bagi Reksadana Saham Oleh: Ahmad Munjin Pasar Modal - Rabu, 11 Januari 2012 | 07:02 WIB INILAH.COM, Jakarta - Momentum January Effect 2012 diprediksi tak terlalu bertaji dibandingkan window dressing. Karena itu, untuk mendapatkan return yang optimal belum tentu berhasil. Analis Infovesta Utama, Edbert Suryajaya mengatakan, pada Januari memang ada momentum January Effect yang diharapkan IHSG bisa positif. Tapi menurutnya, dalam 10 tahun terakhir reksadana saham tidak 100% naik pada Januari. Kondisi ini, lanjutnya, berbeda dengan Desember saat IHSG memiliki momentum window dressing. Reksadana saham 100% mengalami kenaikan dalam 10 tahun terakhir. “Jadi, untuk Januari, kita tidak punya kesimpulan reksadana saham sekuat Desember,” katanya kepada INILAH.COM, di Jakarta. Menurutnya, pada peluang kenaikan reksadana saham pada Januari antara 40% (peluang turun) dan 60% (peluang naik) atau 30% (peluang turun) dan 70% (peluang naik). “Tapi, intinya, peluang kenaikan reksadana saham pada Januari di bawah 80%,” ujarnya. Karena itu, Edbert menegaskan, kalau investor mengandalkan January Effect untuk mendapatkan return yang optimal pada reksadana saham, belum tentu berhasil. “Sebab, secara rata-rata ada produk reksadana yang naik dan ada yang turun,” papar Edbert. Dia memaparkan, pada Januari 2011, kinerja reksadana saham negatif. Diukur dari data 30 Desember 2010 hingga akhir Januari 2011, IHSG turun (-7,95%). Tapi, untuk rata-rata reksadana saham justru minus lebih besar, -9,33%. “Ini merupakan penurunan yang signifikan. Jadi, January Effect untuk reksadana saham belum tentu terjadi,” timpalnya. Untuk Januari 2012 pun, Edbert memperkirakan, punya kemungkinan seperti Januari 2011. Pasalnya, kecemasan pasar yang terjadi awal tahun lalu atas krisis Eropa, masih terbawa ke 2012. “Karena itu, jika mau masuk pada reksadana saham pada Januari harus betul-betul selektif,” ucap dia. Berbeda dengan Desember di mana investor tinggal tutup mata untuk memilih reksadana saham, karena sudah dipastikan naik. Sebab, semua produk reksadana saham bisa naik. Menurutnya, rata-rata kenaikan gain pada reksadana saham dalam 10 tahun terakhir sebesar 5% dengan terendah 2% dan tertinggi 8% pada Desember. Pada Desember 2011, saat IHSG tumbuh 2,88%, indeks 80 produk reksadana saham tumbuh 3,66% alias lebih tinggi dari indeks saham. “Jadi, secara historis, penguatan reksadana saham selalu terjadi saat momentum window dressing dibandingkan momentum January Effect,” tandas Edbert. Meski begitu, Edbert berpesan, investor tak perlu takut untuk investasi reksadana saham pada Januari. “Sebab, tetap ada reksadana saham yang potensial naik pada Januari. Tetap ada pilihan reksadana saham yang potensial positif,” imbuhnya. [mdr]

investasi lindung nilai

Rich managers, poor clients A devastating analysis of hedge-fund returns Jan 7th 2012 | from the print edition the economist HEDGE-fund managers are the smartest investors around. With keen eyes and sharp brains, they spot and exploit inefficiencies in the markets. Or at least that is what the industry tells its clients. ... hedge fund itu sebuah pengelolaan investasi yang sifatnya cerdas karena bertujuan memberikan imbal hasil lebe baek daripada bunga tabungan, deposito, atawa imbal hasil emas, namun disertai dengan tingkat keamanan dan kenyamanan berinvestasi yang tinggi ... well, faktanya SAMI MAWON dengan investasi portofolio laennya ... ada UPS dan ada DOWNS ... sulitnya, malah kerugian SESAAT bisa MENGHAPUS LABA yang terkumpul dalam jangka panjang ... :P There is no doubt that hedge-fund managers have been good at making money for themselves. Many of America’s recently minted billionaires grew rich from hedge clippings. But as a new book* by Simon Lack, who spent many years studying hedge funds at JPMorgan, points out, it is hard to think of any clients that have become rich by investing in hedge funds (whereas Warren Buffett has made millionaires of many of his original investors). Indeed, since 1998, the effective return to hedge-fund clients has only been 2.1% a year, half the return they could have achieved by investing in boring old Treasury bills. In this section How can that be, when traditional performance measures for the industry show average returns of 7% or so? The problem is a familiar one in fund management and is the equivalent of the “winner’s curse” that occurs with auctions (the successful bidder is doomed to overpay). Take a whole bunch of fund managers and give them an equal amount of money to invest. The managers that perform best initially will tend to attract more investors, and so will gradually become bigger than the moderate or poor performers (who will eventually go out of business). But the manager will not perform well indefinitely. By the time a bad year occurs, the manager will be running a much larger fund. In cash terms, the loss on the expanded fund may easily outweigh the gains made when the fund was smaller. The return of the average investor will be lower than the average return of the fund. What is true for individual funds also turns out to be true for the industry as a whole. Between 1998 and 2003 the average hedge fund earned positive returns every year, ranging from 5% in 2002 to 27% in 1999. Back then, however, the industry was quite small: overall assets only passed $200 billion in 2000. That strong performance attracted the attention of pension funds, charities and university endowments at a time when their portfolios had been clobbered by the bursting of the dotcom bubble. They duly piled into “alternative assets” like hedge funds and private equity. By early 2008 the hedge-fund industry had around $2 trillion under management. But that year turned out to be the annus horribilis for the hedge-fund sector. The average performance was a loss of 23%. In cash terms the loss for that single year was more than double the industry’s total assets under management in 2000, when it was still doing well. Mr Lack reckons that the industry may have lost enough money in 2008 to cancel out all the profits it made in the previous ten years. At this point, hedge-fund managers might cry foul. The losses suffered in 2008 make a huge impact on the way Mr Lack calculates his figures. If you use the same methodology on stockmarkets, hedge funds outperformed the S&P 500 between 2001 and the end of 2010. But private-equity managers are judged on a similar basis (the internal rate of return) to Mr Lack’s calculations. And his numbers probably flatter the hedge-fund industry. Indices of hedge-fund returns overstate the numbers because of factors such as “survivor bias” (poor performers stop reporting their numbers) and “backfill bias” (only successful newcomers start to report). These effects could add 3-5 percentage points a year to average returns. Many investors invest in the sector through funds of funds, which charge an additional layer of fees. Even if you allow for the rebound in markets (and hedge-fund returns) in 2009 and 2010, investors have still got the short end of the stick. They have yet to recover the losses suffered in 2008. But hedge-fund managers took home almost $100 billion in fees between 2008 and 2010 (and an aggregate haul of $379 billion between 1998 and 2010). Mr Lack’s book suggests the blind faith displayed by many institutional investors in hedge funds needs to be reconsidered. Individual managers may be brilliant but it is hard to spot them in advance. John Paulson was not particularly well-regarded before he made a fortune betting against subprime bonds—and his performance has slumped since. Investing in hedge funds will enable some lucky managers to enjoy an early retirement on their yachts. It will not enable pension funds to eliminate their deficits. * “The Hedge Fund Mirage: The Illusion of Big Money and Why It’s Too Good to Be True”, published by John Wiley & Sons, January 2012